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DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Acting on the jurisdiction granted in Janson, Fry expands the court's
new role in expediting environmental litigation by enforcing compliance
with its orders through the use of civil contempt without a showing of
intent. As a result, where parties agree to install pollution control equip-
ment, and, fail to do so, the court can issue a contempt order solely on
the basis that the installation was not made." The court no longer needs
to establish that IEPA standards were actually violated, or that the
defendant intentionally violated the order. This standard of proof ena-
bles the court to expeditiously grant relief where the parties have agreed
to the order, and allows individuals yet another forum to enforce compli-
ance with pollution standards.
Roger Smith
Professional Malpractice-Statute of Limitations-CAUSE OF ACTION
ACCRUES IN PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE TORT CLAIMS FROM THE DATE THE
ALLEGED INJURY IS DISCOVERED-Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fash-
ion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 61 Ill.2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975).
The time when a cause of action accrues for purposes of the statute
of limitations for professional malpractice tort claims was significantly
extended by the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Tom Olesker's
Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.' Until this
case a claimant had to bring his action within one year of the date the
tort was committed. The court held that the broader discovery rule,2
generally used only in medical malpractice cases, should be applied
instead. Thus, the cause of action would accrue on the date the claimant
discovered the alleged injury and the statute of limitations would begin
to run on the discovery date. This decision maintains Illinois in a leader-
ship role, along with California, in the development of a trend extending
the discovery rule from the strict confines of medical malpractice cases
permits the attorney general to bring an action in the circuit court to fight pollution
regardless of any administrative agency.
44. The court held in Fry that failure to hold a hearing on the issue of contempt was
not a denial of due process since the defendant had an opportunity to be heard on the
merits of the decree in a hearing on another motion. 59 Ill.2d at 139, 319 N.E.2d at 477.
1. 61 Ill.2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975).
2. The discovery rule holds that a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations
begins to run, on the date the claimant discovered, or with reasonable diligence should
have discovered, the alleged injury. Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill.2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
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to other important areas of professional malpractice. This casenote will
examine the court's reasons for extending the discovery rule and the
implications of that decision.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., a nationwide credit reporting agency, con-
ducted an investigation of Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion,
Inc., a clothing retailer. A credit report was published on January 22,
1969 and was subsequently distributed. It is the policy of Dun & Brad-
street to hold credit reports in strict confidence and to distribute them
only to subscribers who, by contract, agree not to reveal any information
contained in the report.3 A subscriber breached his promise of confiden-
tiality and thirteen months after publication Olesker discovered that
the contents of the report were false and not representative of his busi-
ness.' Relating this to several refusals of credit, Olesker determined that
the credit report was substantially impairing his business, and insti-
tuted a defamation action.5 The trial court dismissed the libel and negli-
gence complaint on the basis that the action was barred by the one year
statute of limitations.' On appeal, Olesker failed to persuade the appel-
late court to adopt the position that the statute of limitations should
begin to run at the time he discovered the libel or, with reasonable
diligence, should have discovered it, rather than at the time of publica-
tion. The court held that adoption of the discovery rule was a matter
for the legislature, and dismissed the action.!
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed' and determined it would follow
3. By contractual stipulation, each subscriber agrees that [all] information
whether printed, written or oral, submitted in answer to regular or special in-
quiry or voluntarily furnished to the subscriber by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., is
for the exclusive use of the subscriber. Such information shall be held in strict
confidence and shall never be revealed or made accessible in any manner what-
ever to the persons reported upon or to any others.
Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433, 437 (3d Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
4. Plaintiff charged that the report grossly underestimated the value of his inventory,
equipment, gross sales and number of employees. Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fash-
ion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 16 Ill.App.3d 709, 711, 306 N.E.2d 549, 551 (1st Dist.
1973).
5. The complaint contained three counts: libel, negligence and tortious interference
with economic advantage. The court's discussion centers, however, on the libel count. 61
ll.2d 129, 130-31, 334 N.E.2d 160, 161 (1975).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 14 (1973).
7. Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 16 Ill.
App.3d 709, 713, 306 N.E.2d 549, 553 (1st Dist. 1973). The court affirmed dismissal of the
libel and negligence counts but reinstated the action for interference with economic ad-
vantage, holding that this count was subject to the five year statute of limitations provi-
sion in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (1973).
8. The supreme court reversed only as to dismissal of the first two counts, thus remand-
ing the case on all three counts. 61 Ill.2d 129, 138, 334 N.E.2d 160, 165 (1975).
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the view it stated previously in the medical malpractice case of Lipsey
v. Michael Reese Hospital In Lipsey, the court pointed out that there
was no legislative determination prohibiting adoption of the discovery
rule.'" Since the legislature had not determined the time at which a
cause of action accrues, the court made this determination." Ulti-
mately, by interpreting the meaning of the word "accrued," the court
in Lipsey was able to apply the discovery rule without contradicting the
statute of limitations or the legislative intent.
The court had two conflicting lines of precedent to consider. First,
there was an established rule in libel cases holding that a cause of action
accrues from the date of publication of the libelous matter. 2 On the
other hand, there were several cases in areas of professional malpractice
holding that a cause of action accrues when the claimant learns of his
injury or should have reasonably learned of it. 3 In deciding which ave-
nue to follow, the court stated that it would not mechanically apply the
statute of limitations and look only to the date of publication, but
rather, it would follow a policy approach of balancing the hardships on
the parties and the purposes served by the statute of limitations. 4
The statute of limitations is intended to be a "statute of repose,"' 5
protecting potential defendants from stale or false claims that might be
difficult to defend after a passage of time, and encouraging diligence in
the bringing of actions. 6 The statute also serves the "interest in cer-
tainty and finality in the administration of [the court's] affairs."' 7
However, in cases in which a person is denied his right to bring an action
before he has knowledge of his injury, the policies of the statute conflict
with the basic rule that every person must be given his day in court.
The courts first faced this important conflict in policies in medical
malpractice cases in which a foreign object was left in a patient's body
after surgery and was not discovered until the statute of limitations had
9. 46 Ill.2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970).
10. Id. at 39, 262 N.E.2d at 454.
11. This view was also followed in a case involving legal malpractice. Kohler v. Woolen,
Brown & Hawkins, 15 Ill.App.3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677 (4th Dist. 1973).
12. Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill.App. 59, 78 N.E.2d 708 (1st Dist. 1948).
13. See Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill.2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970); Rozny v.
Marnul, 43 Ill.2d 54, 250 N.E. 2d 656 (1969).
14. 61 Il1.2d 129, 136-37, 334 N.E.2d 160, 164 (1975).
15. People v. Ross, 325 Ill. 417, 421, 145 N.E. 303, 304 (1927) (criminal case which sets
out the distinction between the statute of limitations in criminal cases and in civil cases).
16. Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 611 (7th Cir. 1975).
17. Id.
18. Peterson, The Undiscovered Cause of Action and the Statute of Limitations: A
Right Without a Remedy in Illinois, 58 ILL. BAR J. 644, 647 (1970).
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expired."' The courts were willing to apply the discovery rule because
these cases did not raise problems the statute was designed to guard
against, such as fraudulent claims or difficulty of proof after a passage
of time.2 Some jurisdictions extended the discovery rule to medical
malpractice cases in which a patient received an improper diagnosis"
or a doctor used improper operative procedures." The rationalization for
the extension was that it was "basically illogical ' 23 to distinguish be-
tween medical malpractice cases involving the leaving of a foreign object
in a patient's body and other types of medical malpractice. Further, the
Illinois Supreme Court in Lipsey indicated that there was no clear legis-
lative intent to justify such a distinction. 4
The injustice resulting in the medical cases prior to application of the
discovery rule prevailed in other cases of professional malpractice. Using
the medical cases as precedent, Illinois courts extended the balancing
technique and policy approach to non-medical malpractice cases. In
Rozny v. Marnul,2 15 where the defendant negligently prepared an inac-
curate land survey which the plaintiff did not discover until nine years
later, the Illinois Supreme Court applied the discovery rule and an-
nounced a test to determine when it should be applied:
[The court must balance] the increase in difficulty of proof which
19. See Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301
N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969) (surgical clamps left in plaintiff's body); Berry v. Branner, 245 Ore.
307, 421 P.2d 996 (1966) (needle left in plaintiff's abdomen); Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash.2d
660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969) (surgical sponge left in plaintiff's abdomen).
20. The initial application of the discovery rule was actually a result of the court's sense
of justice to the unfortunate plaintiff. Several states, including Illinois, now have statutes
which provide for application of the discovery rule in the foreign object situation. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1973).
21. Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1969) (improper diagnosis resulted
in plaintiff undergoing unnecessary surgery); Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32,
262 N.E. 2d 450 (1970) (malignant tumor negligently diagnosed to be nonmalignant caus-
ing plaintiff to later have her arm and shoulder amputated); Iverson v. Lancaster, 158
N.W. 2d 507 (N.D. 1968) (negligent failure to diagnose true cause of hypertension resulted
in plaintiff undergoing unnecessary hysterectomy); Janisch v. Mullins, 1 Wash. App. 393,
461 P.2d 895 (1969) (negligent reading of x-ray resulted in improper diagnosis and treat-
ment).
22. Winfrey v. Farhat, 382 Mich. 380, 170 N.W. 2d 34 (1969) (failure to remove all of a
diseased organ system); Yerzy v. Levine, 108 N.J. Super. 222, 260 A.2d 533, aff 'd, 57 N.J.
234, 271 A.2d 425 (1970) (damage to an organ not to be treated during an operation);
Dobbins v. Clifford, 39 App.Div.2d 1, 330 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1973) (damage to an organ not
to be treated during operation).
23. Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill.2d 32, 40, 262 N.E.2d 450, 455 (1970). See also
Frohs v. Greene, 253 Ore. 1, 4, 452 P.2d 564, 565 (1969).
24. 46 Ill.2d 32, 39-40, 262 N.E.2d 450, 454-55 (1970).
25. 43 Ill.2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
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accompanies the passage of time against the hardship to the plaintiff
who neither knows nor should have known of the existence of his right
to sue."6
Since Rozny other courts have used the balancing technique and have
considered such factors as the nature of the injury, the availability of
witnesses and evidence, the length of time that has elapsed, the dili-
gence of the plaintiff in bringing the action after discovery, and the
prejudice to the defendant if forced to defend." The result, in a few
jurisdictions, mainly Illinois and California," has been an extension of
the discovery rule to cases involving attorneys," insurance agents,30
stockbrokers," accountants,"2 architects,"3 and now credit reporting
agencies.
In applying the discovery rule Illinois courts have firmly stated that
the discovery rule is not an all-encompassing rule and will not be
mechanically applied in all cases of professional negligence. The court
emphasized in Olesker that the discovery rule is a balancing mecha-
nism. Its application must be based on the particular facts of each case'
and on the court's notion of basic fairness to those involved.3
On the basis of the facts in Olesker the court reached a just decision
by considering the conflicting claims of both parties. By applying the
26. Id. at 70, 250 N.E.2d at 664.
27. See, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 276, 300 A.2d 563, 568 (1973).
28. Several jurisdictions have specifically decided not to extend the discovery rule. See,
e.g., Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (stockbroker brought an action against accounting firm for negligence in
preparation of accounting opinions; court held that the statute began to run on the date
of closing of stock sale and not when plaintiff actually learned of the tort); Lembert v.
Gilmore, 312 A.2d 335 (Del. Super. 1973) (involving an inaccurate land survey in which
the Superior Court of Delaware held that the statute of limitations begins to run from the
date of the injury not on the date on which plaintiffs becomes aware of the injury).
29. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal.3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98
Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971); Kohler v. Woolen, Brown & Hawkins, 15 Il. App. 3d 455, 304 N.E.
2d 677 (4th Dist. 1973).
30. U.S. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal.3d 586, 463 P.2d 770, 83
Cal.Rptr. 418 (1970).
31. Twomey v. Mitchum, 262 Cal.App.2d 690, 69 Cal.Rptr. 222 (1968).
32. Moonie v. Lynch, 256 Cal.App.2d 361, 64 Cal.Rptr. 55 (1967).
33. Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 150 N.W.2d 94 (1967).
34. In each case the court will consider "all relevant facts and circumstances." Lopez
v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 276, 300 A.2d 563, 568 (1973).
35. In this case the court based its decision on several factors: (1) the credit report was
confidential and the plaintiff had no practical means of discovering the contents; (2) the
plaintiff was diligent in bringing his action; (3) the court believed that it was unjust to
allow a person to be silently wronged; and (4) the general trend of the court was to protect
those being investigated by credit reporting agencies. 61 ll.2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975).
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statute of limitations mechanically, the court would have automatically
precluded an analysis of the equities of the case. However, how far may
this decision be extended? Should its application be limited to maintain
the goals of certainty and finality of the statute of limitations? By using
the argument of medical cases that some distinctions are "basically
illogical"3 the discovery rule could extend from the Olesker case, in
which there was contractual secrecy, to situations in which there is a
non-contractual agreement or no secrecy agreement. The result could be
that the discovery rule, which began as an exception to the general rule,
could become the general interpretation of the statute. This seems con-
trary to the court's intent which was to apply the rule only in certain
situations to achieve equity.
The application of the discovery rule could be limited by distinguish-
ing between "professional" and "ordinary" negligence cases, and by
applying the discovery rule only to the former. Professional negligence
would be defined as tortious conduct occurring in the "performance of
professional or fiduciary duties,"" that is, conduct within the scope of
the skill, prudence, and diligence commonly exercised by practitioners
of the profession."8 Whereas, ordinary negligence would be defined as
tortious conduct by a person who is not under a duty to exercise a
particular kind of professional skill or expertise."
A second question raised by the decision is exactly how long the court
will extend the period for bringing an action. In Olesker discovery was
only thirteen months after publication; but, what if discovery occurred
several years later? Will the court allow an action to be viable for an
infinite period of time? By use of the balancing technique the court may
establish an end limit in a particular case.4" However, the precedential
value of such a case may be of little assistance in another case with
different facts.
One possible solution would be for the legislature to take positive
action in providing a definite end limit for the bringing of actions. In
36. Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill.2d 32, 40, 262 N.E.2d 450, 455 (1970).
37. Gopaul v. Herrick Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal.App.3d 1002, 113 Cal.Rptr. 811 (1974).
38. Id. at 1007, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 814. The court held that failure to strap a patient to a
guerney was ordinary negligence because the situation did not require professional skill
or knowledge.
39. For example, an attorney who is under a duty to his client to file an action before
the statute of limitations runs out, and fails to do so would be chargeable with professional
negligence. However, the same attorney who injures a pedestrian while driving an automo-
bile would be chargeable, under the definition, with ordinary negligence.
40. A situation could arise where the court uses the balancing technique but decides




cases of medical malpractice the legislature provided that a cause of
action accrues from the time the negligence is discovered or should with
reasonable diligence be discovered; however, the action must be brought
within ten years of the date of the negligent act." By extending this
statute to other areas of professional negligence, or by enacting a sepa-
rate statute applicable to professional negligence cases other than medi-
cal cases, the legislature could achieve the purposes of the statute of
limitations and maintain the flexibility of the balancing mechanism.
Diane Kosmach
Torts-Strict Liability-STRIcT LIABILITY NOT APPLICABLE TO USED CAR
DEALERS ABSENT ACTUAL CREATION OF DEFECT-Peterson v. Lou Backrodt
Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill.2d 17, 329 N.E. 2d 785 (1975).
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court in Peterson v. Lou Backrodt
Chevrolet Co.,' refused to extend strict liability to the used car dealer.2
The case arose when the driver of a six-year-old used car hit two pedes-
trians, both minors, killing one and permanently injuring the other.
Plaintiff sued under strict liability in tort, alleging that the automobile
was not reasonably safe when sold by the used car dealer because it
contained a defective braking system. The trial court dismissed the
strict liability count on grounds that a strict liability cause of action
requires an allegation that the defect existed when it left the manufac-
turer's control, not the used car dealer's.3
The appellate court reversed the trial court.' It-took the position that
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1973).
1. 61 Ill.2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975).
2. Id. at 20, 329 N.E.2d at 786. The complaint alleged that the used car was defective
when sold by the dealer. It did not allege that the used car dealer caused the defect. For
a discussion of this point see note 13 infra.
3. Id. at 19, 329 N.E.2d at 786. This ruling relies upon Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32
Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), the leading Illinois strict liability case.
Suvada stated the requisite standard of proof for the strict liability in tort of a manufac-
turer in a defective products case as proof that (1) injury or damage resulted from a
condition of the product, (2) the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one, and (3)
the condition existed at the time it left the manufacturer's control. 32 Ill.2d at 623, 210
N.E.2d at 188.
4. 17 Ill.App.3d 690,698, 307 N.E.2d 729,735 (2d Dist. 1974).
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